

A Strategic Mass Media Assessment of Boko Haram Conflict in North Eastern Nigeria

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Abstract: *the events surrounding Boko Haram in north eastern segment of Nigeria have emphasized for a more powerful approaches. The nation has confronted enormous hitches in subduing Boko Haram due to its diversified security implications that permeates across most parts of African states, particularly West Africa. Much has been documented on the geneses of Boko Haram. Conversely, the evaluation just explicated slightly on the aspect of the war concerning the nation and Boko Haram. it is this empty space that the manuscript strives to fill by espousing the ideas of non-linear war, synergistic war, warfare beyond bounds and fourth generation warfare to the skirmish in the north east of Nigeria and its extremist groups largely by using the mass media to enlighten the esteem society of the up to date activities of the extremist sect. the army's own tactic had failed to subdue the activities of the extremist groups, somewhat for the lack of fighting incentive of the soldiers, comparatively due to the corruption and incompetence of their superiors and relatively as a result of the failure of the federal Government to make proper use of the enormous mass media channels in propagating the perilous activities of the terrorists to both national and the international audience.*

Keywords: *Nigeria; Boko Haram; Non-Linear War; Synergistic War; Fourth Generation Warfare; Warfare Beyond Bounds, Mass Media.*

Date of Submission: 24-02-2018

Date of acceptance: 12-03-2018

I. Introduction

According to Francis Fukuyama, a theorist in international relations proposes that the dawn of peace has come into the universe after the cold wars of 1990s [1, 2]. The wide-spread wars across nations appeared to cease after the cold war globally [2]. The majority of the conflicts that emerged in 2006, for instance the skirmish of Israel-Hezbollah and Russo Georgian conflict of 2008 over Abkhazia and Ossetia were protracted and lopsided in their set up [2, 3]. The disproportionate set up was assumed to appear as within a state or nation skirmishes that does not require an outside interferences. The global impression of the cold war was suddenly crushed as a result of September 11 2001 assault perpetrated on the United States of America by Al-Qaeda [4]. Subsequent to this mugging and the ensuing pronouncement of war on extremists by the US, the dispute on terrorism was blown up to the vanguard of intercontinental political dialogue. The September 11 assaults have divulged how regimented non-state clusters can encounter the mighty global influence to the vanguard.

Nigeria should not be exempted from the eruptions of non-linear conflicts. Since 1960 when the country got her independence, it has been observed that assaults was instigated by non-state political bodies. Between 1980 and 1982 there was an upsurge of the Maitatsine catastrophe [6], the emergence of the movement for the emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) between 2000 and 2010 [6], the cult group of Ombatse in 2013 [7] and the actions of the radical religious cluster called Boko Haram [8]. Boko Haram is the only religious cluster that endangered the regional uprightness of Nigeria since Biafra civil conflicts which strived to come up with an independent state in the dawn of 1960s. Boko Haram has conducted a long-drawn-out insurgency activity against the Nigerian Government since 2009 [9].

Much has been documented for the geneses and purposes of Boko Haram [10, 11] and Sambisa a woodland where the activities of Boko Haram are endemic in north eastern part of Nigeria, the study of forest [12], encompassing outstanding interpretations of the geneses and incentives of Boko Haram. While a study of the battle for the minds [13], a case study of Boko Haram in Nigeria [14] and counter terrorism in Nigeria [15] have evaluated numerous steps that the Nigerian Government may perhaps take to address the issues of Boko Haram. Most counterinsurgency studies on Boko Haram botch to describe the gravity of the skirmish and presumed that Nigeria was conducting a conflict on extremists. The operative and theoretical contradiction have hindered the evaluation. Even in the orthodox disciplines, the precise diagnosis of any illness is the

initial phase for achieving a therapy. An inaccurate diagnosis or treatment would worsen the situation or perchance kill the individual. The proclamation for Nigeria to be competent enough to come up with a more robust anti-Boko Haram approach, it is imperative to identify diversity of the battle in the north-eastern part of Nigeria [16]. Therefore, this manuscript strives to expound that the conflict between the federal Government of Nigerian and Boko Haram is not sternly an extremist crusade and a conflict on terror, but rather an illustration of the non-linear war and the mass media aspects of enlightening the esteem society of the up to date activities of the extremist sect.

Non-Linear Wars

Non-Linear wars (hybrid) encompass a collection of dissimilar prototypical warfare, these consist of orthodox skills, asymmetrical manoeuvres and establishments, radicalism in its innumerable indexes which include things like suicide-bombings, kidnappings, beheadings and other felonious accomplishments [17]. It integrates multifaceted tactical undertakings executed by discrete divisions, or by similar unit, but are advantageously synchronized and manoeuvred within the opposed precincts to accomplish a combined outcome [18]. The interplanetary where non-linear wars occurred is termed the contested zones (CZ) [19]. It is that interplanetary where the conflicting organizations encounter each other, striving to comprehend their political, social, religious and economic purposes by means of strength and emotional manoeuvres [19]. These CZs commonly consist of the enormously populated borough, forests, highlands and borderlines, and assaults on cultural, educational centres and religious bodies [20]. In the skirmish region, non-linear conflicts synchronized dual approaches of warfare, these include the conventional and asymmetric engagement synchronously and instantaneously. These systems of warfare are commonly utilized interchangeably as the circumstances require. Non-linear wars introduce the disastrous state battle combined with the unrepressed viciousness of asymmetric engagement. In such skirmishes, oppositions exploit entrance to current and sophisticated armaments and communication skills to conduct long-drawn-out skirmishes.

Non-Linear wars or hybrid wars are dissimilar from conventional warfare, merging manoeuvres, approaches, armaments and plans of orthodox and avant-garde warfare [21] conducting such hostilities consist of the application of ambushes, suicide-bombings, the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDS), sexual battering as well as targeted manslaughters. Although the dualistic approaches are operationally cohesive and strategically glued, the asymmetrical piece has a proclivity to operational rather than just draw out battle; as in guerrilla war, incite violence; as with extremists or prolong the cost of safekeeping for the defender; as in counterinsurgency [21]. A topical example of non-linear is the sweltering assaults of the Islamic state (ISIS) over Mosul and Tikrit in Iraq in 2014 [22]. Islamic state battalions utilized the collections of class armaments together with a well-trained territorial army that utilized both orthodox and avant-garde systems of warfare, to engross and extricate the U.S trained Iraqi military [23]. Outside the use of pseudo-army divisions and contemporary armed manoeuvres, the troops that converted later to the Islamic state also made use of ambushes and suicide-bombings.

Non-Linear wars are classified into 3 subtypes, these include a) the fourth generation warfare which preserved an idea of flagging the state as an organizing and governing mechanism which subsequently resulted in the emergence of non-state thespians that were enthusiastic and capable of challenging the legality of the state [24]. An inherent political will and interior social sticking together is fundamental to the concept. The fourth generation warfare thespian utilizes a variety of orthodox and avant-garde abilities, comprising of extremists and misinformation circulated in world wide web, to weaken the willpower of those protecting the state, to unauthentic the Government and to induce an interior cessation of the communal existence [25], b) synergistic war or compound war (CW) are those main wars that have substantial regular and irregular constituents and are close to each other but under integrated control [26]. It happens when a substantial amount of planned organizations subsists between state and non-state militaries in a CZ. The harmonizing effects of CW are produced with the capability to exploit the benefits of each constituent [27]. The non-state portion assaults feeble regions and forces a conventional adversary to disband its militaries, c) warfare beyond bounds or unrestricted warfare encompasses the synchronous deployment of all the funds and possessions of both conflicting militaries in the CZ [27]. The conception denotes to the widespread and thoughtful utilization of the nationwide funds and possessions of a state in such conflict, comprising of monetary, trade, religious, social, cultural and cybernetic resources and human resources; these include enlisted youngsters and under age combatants.

Genesis, Manoeuvres and Policy of Boko Haram

Boko Haram is defined as Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihadin the Arabic Language, meaning "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Struggling or Striving" in English [28]. The cluster became well acknowledged by its Hausa name 'Boko Haram' literally meaning "Western education is forbidden", as a slogan used by the sect. It was an indigenous radical Salafist crusade which transformed into a

Salafi-jihadist extremist group after 2009 [29]. It is established in the northeast of Nigeria, in the regions largely inhabited by the Kanuris [30]. Boko Haram is assumed to have its genesis in 1995 in a crusade titled 'Sahaba' which was under the leadership of Abubakar Lawan [31]. When he travelled to Saudi Arabia to study at the University of Medina, he then approved the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf [32].

The new leadership of the sect later dropped a few of the inherited deep-rooted policies of the sect, restructured Sahaba and reformed its appellation in 2002. Yusuf efficaciously achieved an enormous hangers-on consisting of youths, largely from underprivileged families, age range of 17 and 30 years between 2002 and 2009 [33]. He was able to build a religious compound that has a school and a mosque in Maiduguri in north eastern part of Nigeria for the dissemination and brainwashing of the sect's belief structure. The greater part of his scholars in the north east of Nigeria came from Borno and the neighbouring Cameroon, Chad and Niger [34]. Yusuf flourished in acquiring more hangers-on in numerous states of the north east of the country for instance Yobe, Kano, Bauchi, Katsina and Gombe. In 2004, the crusade was repositioned to Kanamma in Yobe state Yusuf's indigenous town close to Niger boundary [35]. His combatants in Kanamma, were christened as Afghanistan [36]. The sect primarily struggled to form an Islamic regime in the region, but subsequent to his demise in July, 2009 their objective stretched in the direction of setting up an Islamic system in Nigeria regardless of the reality that about 50% of the country's populace are Non-Muslims [37].

Previously in 2010, the extremist group had no seeming plan for realising their goals in the north-eastern part of the country [38]. Sporadically they applied guerrilla manoeuvres to hassle and repress the citizen of the country in the zone they control. The armaments used by the extremist were rudimentary in its forms. The activists occasionally shot at irregular intervals on motorcycles at the civilians and the uniform men and immediately go into seclusion [39]. This approach, nevertheless, experience some changes subsequent to 2010 the sect begins to utilize bombs and improvised explosive devices (IEDS) on premeditated positions [40]. The extremist's manoeuvres comprise bomb blasting of oneself; in the year 2011 on 26 of August, the extremists used car-bombing in Abuja, the country's number one city which was intentionally headed for the UN building and injured 73 persons and killed 21 others [41]. The extremist's resource now includes surface-to air- missiles, automatic rifles, rocket propelled grenades, AK-47 rifles, grenades, Panhard ERC-90 'Sagaie', vehicle mounted machine guns with anti-aircraft visors, T-55 tanks and Semtex another type of explosives for instance [42]. Their manoeuvres became extremely multifaceted, in response to amplified safekeeping processes by the army and in a struggle to induce religious skirmish. The initial assaults in 2010 were principally shootings, but IEDS began to be utilized in December, specifically at the introduction of the elections of 2011 [43]. Subsequent to the elections, the crusade transformed into the use of vehicle-borne IEDS (VBIEDS). The vehicles remained characteristically crammed with numerous propane containers. Additionally, with the intention of spreading its belief to influence wide-ranging audience, the extremist sect started using the internet efficaciously. YouTube became predominantly efficacious in demonstrating the extremists' activities and hostilities with the Nigerian defence force.

The Reaction of Government to the Extremist Groups

At the early phase of the battle between the armed forces of the country and the extremist Boko Haram, the state utilizes her police force to evaluate the conducts of the sect. previously in 2010 the extremist's demeanours comprised largely of social, religious and civil deeds of insubordination to institute indigenous belief. Roadblocks and massive apprehensions were applied extensively by the Nigeria police force (NPF) to restrain the activities of the Boko Haram sect [44]. In 2003, the Government formed joint task force (JTF) due to the inability of NPF to check the activities of the militant sect. during this retro, the sect started burning police posts in Yobe State [45]. The JTF hurled operation flush to apprehend and control the behaviours of the Boko Haram extremist in the northeast in the year 2007 [46]. In 2009, the JTF were able to kill the leader of the sect, Mohammed Yusuf. His demise created a somber argument in indigenous and intercontinental mass media; Mohammed Yusuf was apprehended alive and momentarily detained under the police guardianship before he bafflingly died [47]. The unauthorised assassination of Mohammed Yusuf was believed to have instigated the extremist sect Boko Haram to cuddle into aggressive attitude. With the demise of Mohammed Yusuf, Abubakar Shekau succeeded the throne of the leadership of the extremist sect Boko Haram.

By means of the ascent of Abubakar Shekau on the throne, the battle assumed a more dangerous period. After an annual groundworks, the extremist sect started to use novel manoeuvres and approaches [48]. In 2011, the federal Government was prompted to inaugurate the special military joint task force (SMJTF) [49]. It involves workforces from the defence intelligence agencies (DIA), the Nigeria police force (NPF), the department of state security (DSS) and the Nigerian immigration service (NIS). Additionally, the presence of the new leadership and the intensity of the battle, created two significant vicissitudes. The primary one was the prompting of the Nigerian Government to comprehensively organise its military of about one hundred thousand militaries to oppose the security challenge. Furthermore, it prompted the Government to adjust her strategies against the extremist sect. The Nigerian Government affirmed the state of emergency in the three north-eastern states comprising of Yobe, Adamawa and Borno in May, 2013. The three states were the foremost CZ of the

conflict and also the extremists' stranglehold in Nigeria. At this time, the Government also created a CJTF (civilian joint task force) to supplement the powers of the military in debasing the extremist sect [50]. The CJTF is comprised largely of vigilante clutches, farmers, youths and hunters in the regions most afflicted by the actions of the extremist sect. moreover, the Government of Nigeria formed a new armed forces, the Maiduguri 7th division and furnished them with an assignment to control and defeat the extremist sect [51]. To set up lawful support and efficacious management to these events, the federal Government of Nigeria progressed the passageway of the anti-terrorism act of 2013 [52]. The acts specifies, amongst additional requirements, the obliteration of distrusted extremist territories and death penalty verdicts for the extremist sects. Simultaneously, the Nigerian Government also comes up with a proposition to engross in a planned dialogue with the extremist group [53]. nevertheless, the extremist group persistently snubbed the negotiation.

The president of Nigeria, Muhammad Buhari, in December, 2015 affirmed that the extremist group Boko Haram have been officially conquered [54]. the president proclaimed in January, 2016 that the extremist sect were on the brim of replacement [55]. The federal Government of Nigeria had certainly reconquered most of their counties in the CZs hitherto governed by the extremist group Boko Haram by late 2015. On account of this, the extremist sect found it very difficult to organise orthodox assaults against the Nigerian cantonments in the CZs. They finally retreat onto their throttlehold, a very thick forest called Sambisa located along side Maiduguri, comprising of difficult terrains and amid hilly border district and heavily impassable. The federal Government was capable to check the rebellion largely due to the commitment of cantonments from bordering nations and, of the less mentioned assistance of the South African legionnaires called specialized tasks, training, equipment and protection (STTEP) [56]. The great militias of prosperity, troupers of wild combats of South Africa, proficient selected counterterrorism cantonments in Nigeria were engrossed against the extremist groups [57]. Applying the manoeuvres of persistent chase to overwhelm the terrorist's hit-and-run strategies, an efficacious assault against the terrorists started to yield tremendous results [58]. In late 2015, the MNJTF (multinational joint task force) pledge her assistance to the federal Government of Nigeria, STTEP had done well in pushing the extremist group on the brim of collapse. on the descend of the cantonments from Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger all regulated by the MNJTF, all of these combinations participated in the battle in late 2015 that brought about a more long-lasting outcome [59]. combat hardboiled cantonments from Niger and Chad played vital roles, progressing into the Nigerian region to disentangle the extremist groups [60]. nonetheless, the warfare is still progressing. The extremist sect returned to guerrilla manoeuvres, avoiding physical and mainstream skirmishes with the armed forces. ever since the beginning of 2016, the extremist group resort to the use of proposed locations in the CZs, making substantial use of youthful suicide bombers in their attempt to advance the subversion of northern eastern states of Nigeria.

The Exterior scopes of The Warfare

The Nigeria terrorist group Boko Haram skirmish has its geneses in Nigeria. The leading playhouse of the conflict is northern, eastern part of Nigeria. Conversely, the actions of the conflicting forces had long-drawn-out the conflict further than the boundaries of the country. The rationale for these extensions are apparent. All the aggressive presumed that the involvement of the outside world was critical to accomplish their complete planned intentions. Expressing the battle confirmed intercontinental backing to check the extremist group. Momentously, expressing the battle, particularly putting it in terms of a conflict on terrorism, has permitted the federal Government of Nigeria superior access to foreign army hardware, knowledge and resources.

From the perspectives of the extremist group Boko Haram, expressing the battle tail external support that will come in the form of finance, armed services, armaments and advanced knowledge in manufacturing bomb, acquired from compatible so called Jihadi clusters for instance Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab. These tendencies opened up for Boko Haram to gain international responsiveness and acknowledgement. Expressing the battle becomes enormously challenging for the federal Government to subdue the extremist group deeds. Albeit the federal Government had done perfectly well in scrutinising the extremist set-ups in Nigeria, blocking the indigenous supply of tools and human resources, the foreign connections are expected to consent the extremist group to withstand the uprising insignificantly. The assault on the UN structure in Abuja in 2011, was supposed to give the extremist group an international recognition but absolutely failed [61]. The abduction of the two hundred female students from a secondary school in Chibok, in Borno State that brought the activities of the extremist group into the intercontinental glare of publicity [62]. The abduction act assured the extremist group Boko Haram an international attention.

The extremist group counterfeited acquaintances with the recognised Jihadi establishments for instance Al-Qaeda central in Pakistan and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2010 [63]. These associations provided the extremist group with the required technical know-how in a disproportionate conflict. Perhaps, subsequent to assuring for loyalty to the Islamic State (ISIS), an obvious development in the features of the audio and video assemblies of the extremist group [64]. This proposes that the ISIS have been providing some technical know-how to the terrorist group in media assemblies. Foreign connections also made it

conceivable for the extremist group to get entrance into the intercontinental cradles of Jihad funding, armed forces and armaments.

Excluding the counterfeit acquaintances with some jihadi clusters, the terrorist group Boko Haram, by means of their deeds in the lands of the bordering countries, and also expressed the battle across the region. The extremist group is dynamic in Cameroon, Chad and Niger. For instance, in 2014, the terrorist group assaulted a police post in Kousseri and a Chinese manufacturing industry in Cameroon [65]. In February, 2015 the extremist sect hurried an overwhelming bout on Ngouboua in Chad republic [66]. The rationale for the propagation of the conflict into these nations are also planned. Furthermore, the extremist group tried to indicate to ISIS and Al-Qaeda central that the whole West Africa is under her control [67]. To finish propagating her tasks into the bordering nations of Niger, Chad and Cameroon entail the incessant provision of human resources and tools from Libya, predominantly the Maghreb. The propagation of the warfare transversely to bordering nations also presented the terrorist group an innocuous shelter outside the influence of Nigerian cantonments [68].

The federal Government of Nigeria, expressed the warfare for dual planned motives. The primary motive entails the compelling of her bordering nations at the forefront of the warfare, specifically Cameroon, to assist in regulating her leaky boundaries and to avert the extremist Boko Haram from confronting the federal republic of Nigeria from through the boundaries. The secondary, most significant, motive was for the federal republic of Nigeria to gather intercontinental armed forces and partisan backing against the terrorist group. Due to this reason, the federal Government of Nigeria takes on multidimensional safety covenants with her bordering countries. For example, the federal Government of Nigeria had signed up a safekeeping agreement with Cameroon in February 2012 [69]. The accord safeguarded, amongst other stuffs, the Cameroonian support for the country's battle against the extremist in the bordering zones. The Government of Nigeria had taken an analogous agreement with Niger, launching joint safekeeping perambulations lengthwise the boundaries in October 2012 [70]. Furthermore, the Government of Nigeria sign up a planned for twenty-year security-training agreement with the Britain Government in 2015, offering her with coin training and counterterrorism [71].

Utilising multidimensional machineries, the Government of Nigeria was capable to enlarge the range of manoeuvres of the MNJTF to comprise the attacking of the terrorist in the sub-region of West African. Conversely, the formation of the MNJTF exists before the warfare with the extremist and the Nigerian Government. It initially came into existence in 1994 to contain the banditry across the boundaries in the north-eastern region of the country and includes cantonment from Benin, Chad, Niger and Cameroon [72]. The beginning of the extremist Boko Haram stretched out the range of the security manoeuvre of the MNJTF's to comprise counterterrorism [73]. The command centre of the MNJTF, which was originally at Baga, a local Government area in Borno State of Nigeria, had to be repositioned to N'djamena in Chad, subsequent to the organised assault hurled against it by extremist groups in January 2015 [74]. From its original post in Chad, the MNJTF hurled a well organised assault against the terrorist group in Borno State in September 2015 [75]. By means of this aggression, the extremist group lost some of the regions that it has previously seized from where it had remedied to guerrilla manoeuvres to weaken the north eastern part of Nigeria. Furthermore, Nigeria Government sign up an MoU (memorandum of understanding) inaugurating an EIRU (external intelligence response unit) with France, the United States, Britain, Niger, Cameroon, Chad and Benin in June, 2014 [76].

The Warfare between 2010 And 2015

The battle with the terrorist group has transformed through three dissimilar pathways. From the commencement, the federal Government of Nigerian observed it to be a form of public turbulence when the Government discovered the happenings between 1995 and 2002 [77]. Consequently, it appears as a religious rebellion between 2002 and 2009 [78]. Between 2010 and 2015, the conflict assumes its ultimate form. It converted to a conflict on insurgency on the one side and a terrorism on the other [79]. It is of from this ultimate form that the real structure of the conflict can be garnered.

A conflict has some rudimentary explainable characteristics. Albeit its present-day description now incorporates asymmetric warfare, it has some commonly recognised physiognomies [80]. One of them is the adherence to reputable guidelines of appointment. Usually, the fighters take exceptional attention in the course of appointments to safeguard civilians from the ferocity of warfare. Quantity is also a well-known rule. Violence has no room for the guidelines of appointment. The extremist group only proceeded from sporadic assaults to asymmetrical conflict in 2010. It is a well-known information that the skirmishes between the Nigeria Government and the extremist group was obvious since early 2000. It could be recalled that the founder of the extremist group, Mohammed Yusuf, was executed in 2009 alongside with over nine hundred of his cliques by the Nigerian security forces [81]. The extremist group afterward detached to regroup. In 2010, the leader on the throne Abubakar Shekau intensified the skirmish and escalated it to a more precarious and unobstructed stage. As well as in quest of retaliation, a foremost feature accountable for this intensification was the craving of the extremist group to Islamise Nigeria as a longstanding motive. As from 2010, there has been a

conspicuous modification in the extremist manoeuvres in its conflicts with the federal Government of Nigerian. For the first time, the extremist group conducted a successions of a prudently harmonised and lethal bombing crusades in Nigeria, focused on both secular and religious targets.

From 2010 forward, the terrorist group started hurling a sequence of attacks on security edifices and armed forces fittings in the north eastern part of Nigeria. For instance, on 7 of September, 2010, the extremist group attacked and clogged a prison in Bauchi, emancipating over seven hundred inmates in the process [82]. Between 2010 and 2015, the terrorist group attacks became more audacious and shameless. It has never occurred in times past of partisanvehemence in Nigeria by any group purposefully embattled not just soldierly assemblies, but armed forces barracks and formations in the CZs. The assaultshurled on Giwa barrack and Bagaarmed forces base in Borno in 2014 and 2015 are circumstancesthat were obvious [83]. In the dual happenstances, over five hundred lives were lost. Whatwas perceptible in the course of the conflict was that the opponentsinstantaneouslyengagedconventional and asymmetric manoeuvres and approaches in conducting the warfare. This is one reason why the terrorist and Nigeria skirmish can be designated as a form of non-linear war or hybrid warfare.

TheNigerianGovernment and the Boko Haramconflict has gone through the dissimilar stages. Elements of unrestricted warfare could be seen in the use of girls as young as 10 years old as suicide bombers [84]. This is the fact that the group uses men and women in carrying out conventional suicide bombings and VBSBS. A good example was the deadly suicide attack in Borno that injured over 139 people and killed 58 in March 2015 [85]. During this stage, Boko Haramvigorously targeted Nigerians of dissimilar religious persuasions. Susceptible groups such as the old, the infirm, women and children were not rendered any secured position. Mosques, churches, imams, and pastors, traditional chiefs, secondary schools, universities, markets, car depots and restaurants became genuine targets. Boko Haram also became very adept at using cyberspace. It efficiently communicates via Facebook, YouTube and twitter during her conflict against the NigerianGovernment. The group made use of every tangible and intangible fund at its disposal to wage warfare. During this stage, the NigerianGovernment also used substantial funds to wage warfare. The military utilised manoeuvres and approaches such as the declaration of a state of emergency in the CZs, apprehension and bullying of spouses and relatives of known extremist group members while purposefully breaking humanitarian rules of engagement. This was the motive why human rights watch (HRW) wrote a perilous report about the actions of the Nigerian forces in the CZs and its management of prisoners in the course of the war [86]. The point here is that during the unrestricted stage, the opponents used conventional and unconventional methods in accusing the conflict. The responses of the opposing forces were disproportional and civilian counter value targets were aggressively hunted and demolished.

On the fourth generation warfare stage, which transpired insimilarepoch, the terrorist group effectually wanted to weaken the independent reliability of the federal Government of Nigerian. They want to accomplish this through unremitting and pervasive assaults on armed forces and a member of the public structures in the country. The goal was to prove to the citizen of the country that the Government has no ability to safeguard them. This was perchance the foremost motive why the extremist group conducted the brash abduction of about two hundred Chibok female students from their institution in 2014 in Borno [87]. Therecurrent bouts against the armed forces organisation targeting for instance munition depots and barracks were planning to demonstrate to the people that the Nigerianarmed forces were deficient of the capability to safeguard herself. The internet played anessential part in the publicity struggles of the extremist group. As the Federal Government cannotefficiently expurgate what was dispatched on-line, the extremist group used YouTube to publiciseher intimidations against the federal Government of Nigerian. The activities of the terrorist group against the citizens in the CZs as well as her management of the vicinities under her rheostat were despatched online. All of these exertions were directed towards not to authenticate of the power of the federal republic of Nigeria in what amounts to psychological warfare.

Throughout the synergistic war or compound warfare stage, the conflicting forces organised asymmetric and conventional manoeuvres and tactics instantaneously in the CZs. in some cases, there were instances of a realsetback to the armed forces taking up the pretext of the extremist groups and the military doing the same. the NigeriaGovernment formed a special CTS (counter terrorism squad) the goal of which was to go into the terrorist regions in the CZs and balance the exertions of the armed forces [88].the extremist groups in turn pretended as regular forces of the NigerianGovernment so as to create an easyblast-off ofshock assaults on the communities in the CZs. This was what transpired when the terrorist groupconfronted Gwoza local Government area in Borno State in 2014 [89].Furthermore, the terrorists assumed a conventional military approach to challenge the armed forces of Nigerian throughout this stage. Aleading case was the bout on Bagaarmed forces barrack in January of 2015. A video released by the extremist group of the skirmish displayed how it confronted the armed forces barrack head-on, utilising lots of ak-47, vehicle mounted machine guns and infantry foot militaries. This is not dissimilar from how a regular military would bouththeadversary's post in a conventional war. On the federal Government of Nigerian part, the CJTF played an essential roles throughout this stage of the warfare. It performed as an illegal intelligence-gathering unit of the SMJTF and, in many

instances, performed also as the first line of defence against the terrorists [90]. In March 2014, the SMJTF was able to stop a bomb bout on an internally displaced persons' camp in Maiduguri due to the well-timed intelligence delivered by the CJTF. On several occasions the involvement of the CJTF in the real combat operations was decisive to overwhelming the extremist group assaults in the CZs [91]. Thus, the simultaneous and synchronous use of conventional (JTF) and unconventional (CJTF) forces and the use of conventional and unconventional manoeuvres qualify the condition as being one of synergistic war or compound warfare.

II. Conclusion

In order to stop or arrest any mischievous dealings and to also understand the nature of the war between the federal Government of Nigeria and the extremist group Boko Haram throughout warfare, it is paramount and also very essential to utilise the mass media in disseminating the events through multitude of channels such as the YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp's, TVs, etc. The federal Government of Nigeria has on numerous occasions mentioned the battle with the extremist groups as a radical crusade, an insurgency and a religious war. In line with this intellectual outcome, the federal Government of Nigeria had tried various strategies which did not fit the kind of warfare being fought by the extremist groups. The army's own tactic had failed to subdue the activities of the extremist groups, somewhat for the lack of fighting incentive of the soldiers, comparatively due to the corruption and incompetence of their superiors and relatively as a result of the failure of the federal Government to make proper use of the enormous mass media channels in propagating the perilous activities of the terrorists to both national and the international audience.

III. Conflict of Interest

The authors' have no interest to declare.

IV. Acknowledgement

The authors really appreciate the immense contribution of Dr. Lawan Adamu of Department of Veterinary Medicine, University of Maiduguri for proofreading and improving the quality of the article in many respects thereby making it an invaluable review manuscript.

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